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All known qudit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (PM-QKD) schemes are
more error resilient than their qubit-based counterparts. Their high error resiliency comes partly
from the careful encoding of multiple bits of signals used to generate the raw key in each transmitted
qudit so that the same eavesdropping attempt causes a higher bit error rate (BER) in the raw key.
Here I show that highly error-tolerant PM-QKD schemes can be constructed simply by encoding
one bit of classical information in each transmitted qudit in the form (|i〉± |j〉)/√2, where |i〉’s form
an orthonormal basis of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space. Moreover, I prove that these schemes
can tolerate up to the theoretical maximum of 50% BER for n ≥ 2 provided that the raw key
is generated under a certain technical condition, making them the most error-tolerant PM-QKD
schemes involving the transmission of unentangled finite-dimensional qudits to date. This shows the
potential of processing quantum information using lower-dimensional quantum signals encoded in a
higher-dimensional quantum state.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Aa, 89.70.-a
Introduction — Quantum key distribution (QKD) al-
lows two cooperative players, Alice and Bob, to share
a secret key whose security is guaranteed by the laws
of quantum mechanics. Since the discovery of the first
QKD scheme by Bennett and Brassard [1], researchers
have been studying different aspects of QKD. New QKD
protocols that are either more practical, efficient or error
tolerant have been proposed. Actual QKD experiments
for some of the protocols have been carried out. Uncondi-
tionally security proofs, including those covering realistic
settings like the use of imperfect sources and detectors,
for many of these protocols have been found. (See, for
example, the review article in Ref. [2] for an overview.)
One line of research is to investigate the use of qu-
dits rather than qubits as quantum information carri-
ers in QKD. In particular, Chau proved the uncondi-
tional security of a prepare-and-measure quantum key
distribution (PM-QKD) scheme (called Chau05) using
2n-dimensional quantum particles as information carri-
ers each encoding n bits of the raw key [3]. Although
his scheme has a very low key rate and is hard to imple-
ment using current technology, it can tolerate a bit error
rate (BER) of up to 50% in the limit of n → +∞ [4].
This demonstrates the superior error-tolerant capability
of qudit-based PM-QKD scheme as the best qubit-based
PM-QKD scheme known to date can only tolerate up to
about 27.4% BER [5]. Recently, Sasaki et al. proposed a
radically different qudit-based PM-QKD scheme known
as the round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) pro-
tocol in which Alice encodes multiple bits si’s in each of
the N -dimensional qudit state as
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(−1)si |i〉 (1)
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so that Bob’s measurement can only reveal one of the
(si − sj)’s of his choice [6]. This is a conceptually im-
portant scheme for it demonstrates that the security of
QKD needs not link to the Heisenberg uncertainty prin-
ciple [7]. In terms of performance, the RRDPS proto-
col can also tolerate up to 50% BER in the N → +∞
limit. Besides, if the BER of the raw key is low, the key
rate of the RRDPS protocol is much higher than that of
Chau05. Several proof-of-principle experiments for the
RRDPS protocol have been conducted [8–10].
Here I report a family of qudit-based PM-QKD
schemes whose security comes from a new principle. In
these schemes, Alice and Bob randomly and indepen-
dently prepare and measure qubit-like states each in the
form (|i〉± |j〉)/√2 in a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space for
n ≥ 2 so that only one bit of the raw key is encoded and
transmitted in the phase of each qudit state. (Here |i〉’s
form an orthonormal basis of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert
space.) The security originates from the fact that the
eavesdropper Eve has a hard time to read out a sizable
portion of the raw key without being caught because
she does not know the preparation basis of each qudit
at the time when the quantum state is passing through
the insecure channel under her control. By identifying
|i〉 as the single photon state in the ith optical pulse,
these schemes have the additional attractive feature that
the prepared states, which are essentially qubit states in
diagonal basis, can be easily created and measured us-
ing a standard optical interferometer with variable path
length. (Interestingly, the experimental techniques used
to prepare quantum states in Expression (1) in Refs. [8–
10] can be adapted to prepare the states (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2.)
Using an aggressive entanglement distillation procedure
involving local operation and two-way classical communi-
cations (LOCC2) originally reported in Ref. [5], I prove
that Alice and Bob could share a provably secure se-
cret key whenever the BER is less than 50% provided
that the raw key obeys the technical condition to be
2stated in Eq. (2) later in the text, making it the first
family of PM-QKD schemes that saturates the theoret-
ical maximum limit of the tolerable BER using unen-
tangled finite-dimensional quantum information carriers.
This opens up the study of processing quantum informa-
tion through the use of lower-dimensional quantum states
embedded in a higher-dimensional Hilbert space or trans-
ferred through a higher-dimensional quantum channel.
The schemes — Let me denote the finite field of N ≡
2n elements by GF (N) and consider the following family
of schemes.
The family of PM-QKD schemes:
1. Alice randomly picks i 6= j ∈ GF (N). She secretly
prepares a state in the form (|i〉±|j〉)/√2 and sends
it to Bob through an insecure quantum channel.
2. Bob randomly picks i′ 6= j′ ∈ GF (N) and measures
the state along |i′〉±|j′〉. He keeps his measurement
outcome private.
3. By announcing the pairs (i, j) and (i′, j′) through
an unjammable classical channel, Alice and Bob
establish a bit of raw key from those states with
(i, j) = (i′, j′). (They adopt the convention that
[|i〉 + (−1)s|j〉]/√2 encodes the bit s.) They dis-
card the measurement outcomes of those states
with (i, j) 6= (i′, j′). They repeat steps 1–3 until
they have a long enough raw key.
4. They estimate the BER of the raw key eb, namely,
the fraction of mismatched bits in their shared raw
bit string, by comparing (and then discarding) a
small random sample of the raw key. Using both
accepted and rejected measurement outcomes in
step 3, they calculate the conditional probability
ec that a state is prepared and measured as (|i〉 ±
|j〉)/√2 given that it is prepared as (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2
and measured as [|(1−a)i+aj〉±|(a+1)j−ai〉]/√2
for some i, j, a ∈ GF (N). (Note that all arithmetic
in the state-ket of a qudit is performed in the finite
field GF (N) from now on.) They continue only if
ebec +
(N − 1)(1− ec)
N − 2 <
1
2
. (2)
5. Alice and Bob apply the following LOCC2 classical
post-processing procedure to the remaining raw key
adapted from Ref. [5]. The values of the parameters
k and r used in this procedure will be discussed in
Methods.
(a) Alice and Bob randomly group their cor-
responding bits in their remaining raw key
in pairs. They reveal the parity of each
corresponding pair and keep the first bit
in those corresponding pairs whose parities
agree. They repeat this process k times.
(b) Alice and Bob randomly group their corre-
sponding bits in their remaining raw key in
sets each containing r bits. They replace each
set by the parity of the r bits in the set.
(c) Alice and Bob obtain their final secret key by
applying the Shor-Preskill privacy amplifica-
tion procedure [5, 11] to these bits using a
Calderbank-Shor-Steane code that could cor-
rect up to, say, 1% quantum error.
Note that for the case of N = 4, the above scheme
takes a rather simple form. Alice and Bob keep those
states that are prepared and measured in diagonal basis
of the same Hilbert subspaceHij ≡ span(|i〉, |j〉) for some
i 6= j ∈ GF (4). In addition, ec equals the length of
the raw key divided by the total number of qudits that
are prepared in the subspace Hij and measured in either
Hij or Hab subspaces, where i, j, a, b are the four distinct
elements of GF (4).
The unconditional security proof — Now I show the
unconditional security [12, 13] of this family of PM-QKD
schemes for N ≥ 4 by proving the unconditional secu-
rity of the following associated family of entanglement-
distillation-based quantum key distribution (ED-QKD)
protocols using the Shor-Preskill-type argument [11].
The associated family of ED-QKD protocols:
1. Alice prepares the state
∑
ℓ∈GF (2) |ℓ, ℓ〉/
√
2. She
randomly picks λ, β ∈ GF (N) with λ 6= 0 and ap-
plies the linear transformation
Lλβ |a〉 = |λa+ β〉 (3)
for all a ∈ GF (N) to the second qudit. She keeps
the first qudit and sends the second qudit to Bob
through an insecure quantum channel.
2. Bob randomly picks λ′, β′ ∈ GF (N) with λ′ 6= 0
and applies L−1λ′β′ to the qudit he received from Al-
ice. Then, Alice and Bob projectively measure their
shared state along the basis
B = {|Ψaℓ〉 : a ∈ GF (N), ℓ ∈ GF (2)}, (4)
where |Ψaℓ〉 ≡ [|0, a〉 + (−1)ℓ|1, a + 1〉]/2. They
keep those states in the form |Ψκℓ〉 with κ ∈ GF (2)
(which are regarded as qubit pairs from now on)
provided that λ = λ′, β = β′. They repeat steps 1–
2 until they have enough number of shared qubits.
3. Let eaℓ be the conditional probability that the joint
measurement outcome in step 2 is |Ψaℓ〉 given that
λ = λ′ and β = β′. They continue only if
e01 + e11 + (N − 1)(e10 + e11) < 1
2
. (5)
34. Alice and Bob perform the following entanglement
purification procedure adapted from Ref. [5].
(a) They randomly group their corresponding
qubits in tetrads where each tetrad consists
of two pairs shared by them. Alice applies
the unitary operation |ψκ, ψℓ〉 7→ |ψκ, ψκ+ℓ〉 to
her share of the particles in the tetrad, where
|ψκ〉 ≡ [|0〉 + (−1)κ|1〉]/
√
2; and Bob does
the same to his corresponding particles in the
tetrad. Alice and Bob keep their second qubit
pair if the measurement results of their first
qubit pair in the diagonal basis B× ≡ {ψ0, ψ1}
agree. They repeat this process k times.
(b) They randomly group their remaining qubits
in sets each with r shared qubit pairs. They
separately apply the [r, 1, r] majority-vote er-
ror correction code for the rectilinear basis to
their share of the qubits in each set.
(c) They apply a Calderbank-Shor-Steane code
that could correct up to 1% quantum error to
the remaining shared quantum state to distill
out almost perfect |Ψ00〉 EPR pairs. Finally,
by measuring each qubit of these states along
the diagonal basis B× Alice and Bob obtain
their secret key.
Clearly |Ψaℓ〉 = (I ⊗ XaZℓ)|Ψ00〉 where
Xa|b〉 = |a+ b〉 and Z|b〉 = (−1)N (b)|b〉 (6)
for all b ∈ GF (N). Here N (b) = bN−1 is the norm of
b [14]. Note that N(0) = 0 and N(b) = 1 if b 6= 0.
Consider the expression
(I ⊗ L−1λβXaZℓLλβ)|Ψbκ〉
=
∑
ν∈GF (2)
(−1)κν+ℓN (λ(ν+b)+β)|ν, ν + b+ λ−1a〉 (7)
for all λ 6= 0, β, a, b ∈ GF (N) and ℓ, κ ∈ GF (2). Up to
an irrelevant global phase, the R.H.S. of Eq. (7) equals
|Ψb+λ−1a,κ′〉. Here κ′ = κ if ℓ = 0 or N (λb + β) =
N (λ(b + 1) + β); and κ′ = κ + 1 otherwise. Hence, the
sequences of probabilities of measurement outcome along
B conditioned on different λ = λ′ and β = β′ in step 2 of
the ED-QKD protocol transform from one to another by
permutation. In addition, all operations in step 4 except
the final measurement in the diagonal basis permute el-
ements in B up to an irrelevant phase. Therefore, Alice
(Bob) may push the final measurement in B× in step 4c
forward in time to immediately after step 1 (2) [5, 15].
By renaming λ = j − i and β = i, I get Lλβ |0〉 = |i〉
and Lλβ |1〉 = |j〉. Consequently, this ED-QKD protocol
is reduced to the PM-QKD scheme. Furthermore, the
Shor-Preskill argument implies that the unconditional se-
curity of the above PM-QKD scheme follows that of the
ED-QKD protocol [11].
I now proceed to analyze the security of the ED-
QKD protocol. Clearly, the probabilities eaℓ’s obeys∑
a∈GF (N),ℓ∈GF (2) eaℓ = 1. Since λ and β are randomly
chosen for each transmitted qudit and are unknown to
Eve during the transmission, Eq. (7) implies that
ea0 + ea1 = eb0 + eb1 (8)
for all non-zero a, b ∈ GF (N). So, if Eq. (5) is satisfied,
e00 > 1/2 is the greatest element among the eaℓ’s. Fur-
thermore, by comparing the definitions of eb, ec in step 4
of the PM-QKD schemes with the definitions of eaℓ’s in
step 3 of the ED-QKD protocols, I find the following cor-
respondences:
ebec = (e01 + e11), (9)
ec = e00 + e10 + e01 + e11 (10)
and
1− ec = (e10 + e11)(N − 2). (11)
Thus, Eq. (5) implies Eq. (2).
The probabilities that the joint measurement outcomes
for those remaining shared qubits just before step 4 of the
ED-QKD protocol can be written as the elements of the
2× 2 error matrix(
pI pz
px py
)
≡ 1
ec
(
e00 e01
e10 e11
)
. (12)
By treating each pair of shared qudits as shared qubit
pair, then pI , px, py and pz can be regarded as the prob-
abilities that Bob’s share of the qubit pair has suffered
I, σx σy and σz errors, respectively.
Note that in the above ED-QKD protocol, step 4 is
analogous to a similar procedure in Ref. [5] with the roles
ofX- and Z-errors being swapped. That is to say, step 4a
is a variation of the BXOR test [16, 17] that reduces the
Z-error of the resultant qubit pairs; whereas step 4b re-
duces the X-error. Applying Proposition 1 in Ref. [5]
with the roles of X- and Z-errors exchanged, the corre-
sponding error matrix for the shared qubits immediately
after step 4a equals(
pkEPI p
kEP
z
pkEPx p
kEP
y
)
=
1
2(A+ C)
(
A+B C +D
A−B C −D
)
, (13)
where A = (pI + px)
2k , B = (pI − px)2k , C = (py + pz)2k
and D = (py − pz)2k . Since e00 > 1/2, so is pI . Hence
from Proposition 2 in Ref. [5] (again withX- and Z-errors
exchanged), the quantum error rate of the shared qubits
can be reduced to less than 1% after step 4b and therefore
almost perfect |Ψ00〉’s can be distilled in step 4c if the r in
step 4b equals 0.005/(pkEPy + p
kEP
z ) and 2r(1/2− pkEPx −
pkEPy )
2 ≫ 1. Such an r exists if (B+D)2 ≫ 400C(A+C).
Since pI > 1/2, pI − pz > px − py. Thus, r exists by
picking a sufficiently large k as long as
(pI − px)2 > (pI + px)(py + pz). (14)
4(Incidentally, the same condition has been proven in
Ref. [5] for the special case of px = py = pz.) From
Eqs. (9) and (12) plus the fact that e00 + ebec + (N −
1)(1− ec)/(N − 2)− e11 = 1, the sufficient condition for
the existence of r can be rewritten as
f(eb, ec, e11) =
[
1− ebec − N(1− ec)
N − 2 + 2e11
]2
− eb(1 − eb)e2c > 0. (15)
The maximum tolerable BER emax of the ED-
QKD protocol and hence the PM-QKD scheme is
the largest possible eb provided that the parameters
eb, ec, e11 pass the test in step 3 of the ED-QKD
protocol. That is, emax = sup{eb : f(eb, ec, e11) >
0 for all ec, e11 with (eb, ec, e11) ∈ R}, where R =
{(eb, ec, e11) ∈ [0, 1]3 : ebec + (N − 1)(1 − ec)/(N − 2) <
1/2}. Since f is quadratic in eb, ec and e11, the value
of emax can be calculated readily. Specifically, elements
in R obey 1 − ebec − N(1 − ec)/(N − 2) > 0. So,
f(eb, ec, e11) ≥ f(eb, ec, 0) for all (eb, ec, e11) ∈ R. More-
over, for any fixed eb ∈ [0, 1/2) and by varying ec in R,
it is straightforward to see that f(eb, ec, 0) is minimized
when ec = e
∗
c(eb) ≡ N/[2(N − 1 − (N − 2)eb]. Finally,
it is easy to check that f(eb, e
∗
c(eb), 0) > 0 if and only
if eb ∈ [0, 1/2) provided that N ≥ 4. In summary, for
(eb, ec, e11) ∈ R, f(eb, ec, e11) > 0 whenever eb < 1/2.
Besides, f → 0 as e11 = 0, eb → 1/2 and ec → 1. There-
fore, emax = 1/2; and this can be attained when Eve
feeds every particle sent by Alice through a completely
dephasing channel before giving it to Bob.
By the standard composability definition of security for
QKD [12, 13], the family of ED-QKD protocols forN ≥ 4
can, therefore, produce a shared secret key whenever the
BER is less then 50%.
To conclude, using the above family of PM-QKD
schemes, Alice and Bob can establish a secure key when-
ever the BER of the raw key is less than 50% pro-
vided that N ≥ 4 and the accepted data rate ec obeys
Eq. (2). Since it is impossible to recover any encoded
classical message after sending through a binary sym-
metric channel with crossover probability 1/2, this family
of PM-QKD schemes shows that the most error-tolerant
QKD scheme (as measured by its tolerable BER) can
be constructed by sending 4-dimensional qubit-like qu-
dits each containing a single bit of classical informa-
tion encoded in its phase. (The most error-tolerant
scheme of this type using 4-dimensional qudits before
this study was Chau05, which can distill a secret key up
to 35.6% BER.) The security of this family of schemes
comes partly from the ability to deduce the X-error rate
through a clever use of the accepted data rate ec in step 4.
This opens up new possibilities for doing quantum infor-
mation processing through carefully designed algorithms
that sends lower-dimensional quantum states through a
higher-dimensional channel.
Outlook — So far, the analysis is restricted to the case
of ideal source and detectors in the arbitrarily long raw
key length limit. One still needs to investigate of the
security and performance of this family of schemes for
realistic source (say, by decoy state method [18–20]) and
detector (say, by measurement-device-independent tech-
niques [21, 22]) in the finite-key-length setting [23–26] us-
ing one-way or two-way classical post-processing. They
will be reported elsewhere.
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